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To prove your identity to someone, it is often said that you can use three things:
• using what your are
• using what you have
• using what you know For identification schemes, the goal is to confirm someone's identity based on what that person knows in real time. (In contrast, with digital signatures, one can authenticate messages way after the messages have been signed. )
In practice, identification schemes must be simple enough so that it can be implemented in objects like smart cards and RFID's. Its amount of communication and memory requirements must be small.
The model. In our model, Alice wishes to identify herself to Bob and maybe Bob to Alice as well. This will be done through an interactive protocol. Alice and Bob will alternately talk to each other by sending information across a communication channel. Each run of the protocol is called a session.
The adversary. We will assume that the adversary can listen in to Alice and Bob's conversation -i.e., s/he can see all the information that is being transmitted between the two of them.
Claim: Identification schemes must involve randomness. That is, Alice cannot use the same information to verify her identity to Bob and someone else.
Why?
Identification Schemes from Cryptographic Primitives 1. Challenge-and-response in the symmetric key setting
Review: Message Authentication Codes
Under this setting, we assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key K. Here's one protocol they can use so Alice can confirm to Bob that she's indeed Alice.
Protocol 1a: Insecure Challenge-and-Response 1. Bob chooses a random challenge r which he sends to Alice.
2. Alice computes y = M AC K (r) and sends y to Bob.
3. Bob computes y = M AC K (r). If y = y then Bob accepts; otherwise, Bob rejects.
The problem: Protocol 1a is susceptible to a parallel session attack.
Protocol 1b: Secure Challenge-and-Response 1. Bob chooses a random challenge r which he sends to Alice. The problem: Protocol 2a is susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack.
Protocol 2b: Secure Mutual Challenge-and-Response 1. Bob chooses a random challenge r 1 which he sends to Alice.
2. Alice chooses a random challenge r 2 . She then computes y 1 = M AC K (ID(Alice)||r 1 ||r 2 ). She then sends r 2 and y 1 to Bob.
3. Bob computes y 1 = M AC K (ID(Alice)||r 1 ||r 2 ). If y 1 = y 1 , Bob accepts; otherwise, Bob rejects. Bob also computes y 2 = M AC K (ID(Bob)||r 2 ) which he sends to Alice.
4. Alice computes y 2 = M AC K (ID(Bob)||r 2 ) . If y 2 = y 2 , Alice accepts; otherwise, Alice rejects.
2. Challenge-and-response in the public key setting
In this setting, Alice and Bob no longer have a shared secret key. Instead, we assume that they both have a set of public and private keys that is used for a certain pre-specified digital signature scheme. We will also assume that each one of them has a certificate from a trusted authority (e.g., a certification authority) that "certifies" their public keys. The certificate for Alice is denoted as Cert(Alice) and contains ID(Alice) and p Alice , the public key of Alice. Likewise, Bob's certificate, Cert(Bob), contains ID(Bob) and p Bob , the public key of Bob.
Below is a mutual identification scheme which is very similar to Protocol 2b. The main difference is the MAC in Protocol 2b is replaced with a digital signature scheme sig whose verification algorithm is ver.
Protocol 3: Public-key Mutual Identification Scheme 1. Bob chooses a random challenge r 1 . He sends Cert(Bob) and r 1 to Alice.
2. Alice chooses a random challenge r 2 . She then signs the "message" ID(Bob)||r 1 ||r 2 using her private key to create the signature y 1 = sig Alice (ID(Bob)||r 1 ||r 2 ).
She sends Cert(Alice), y 1 , r 2 to Bob.
3. Bob extracts Alice's public key from Cert(Alice). He then checks that ver Alice (y 1 ) = (ID(Bob)||r 1 ||r 2 ). If yes, Bob accepts; otherwise, Bob rejects. Bob also signs the "message" ID(Alice)||r 2 using his private key to create the signature y 2 = sig Bob (ID(Alice)||r 2 ).
